Let's be honest about what quantum computers can do today: almost nothing useful in production. A quantum computer works by manipulating quantum bits, or qubits, which unlike regular bits can exist in multiple states at once. This lets them explore many solutions simultaneously, in theory. In practice, qubits are extraordinarily fragile. Stray heat, vibration, even ambient radiation causes errors. Current machines need massive error-correction overhead, meaning most of their qubits are spent just keeping other qubits honest. A useful fault-tolerant quantum computer, one that meaningfully beats classical hardware on real problems, is likely ten to fifteen years away by conservative estimates, and that is not a knock. It is just the physics.
Three Government Bets on an Unfinished Machine
This week alone: Canada committed CAD $195 million to Xanadu, a photonic quantum computing company, for manufacturing scale-up. Photonic means Xanadu's qubits are carried by particles of light rather than superconducting circuits, which theoretically allows room-temperature operation rather than cooling to near absolute zero. Simultaneously, Italy's highest administrative court voided a 61.2 million euro contract awarded to IBM for the country's first quantum computer, citing procurement irregularities. And New Mexico announced matching funds for quantum companies pursuing DARPA's Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, a program designed to actually measure whether quantum machines do what vendors claim. That last one matters most. DARPA's benchmarking initiative exists precisely because the marketing language around quantum, words like supremacy and advantage, has historically outpaced the peer-reviewed results.
The Real Product: Positioning
The legal note is telling. A new analysis shows three law firms hold nearly two-thirds of all recorded quantum legal work, a concentration that mirrors exactly how early cloud and AI infrastructure contracts consolidated. Quantum computing's near-term product is not computation. It is government positioning, regulatory moats, and IP portfolios built while the technology matures. Canada is not buying a working quantum computer. It is buying the right to have built one first when it eventually works. The IBM Italy case shows that procurement officials are now sophisticated enough to challenge those bets when they sour, which is either a sign of maturity or a sign that the promise is running ahead of delivery fast enough to create legal exposure. Probably both.